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A COMPARISON OF FOUR MODELS OF TAXATION
IN THEIR TREATMENT OF SOCIAL
SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
JOHN L. BROWNt
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an analysis of how four different models of tax-
ation apply to contributions and benefits in the social security
retirement system.' The four models and their applications
are as follows:
1. The accretion model: (a)- the present value of contributions,
or payroll taxes, from taxpayer and employer, are included in
taxpayer's tax base; (b) growth in the value of contributions is
computed yearly and included in the tax base; (c) upon retire-
ment, benefits received less adjusted basis are taxed.
2. The consumption model: (a) all contributions are excluded
from taxpayer's tax base; (b) all growth in contributions is ex-
cluded from the tax base; (c) upon retirement, benefits are tax-
able to the extent they are consumed, without recovery of
basis.
3. The partially tax-prepaid model (pre-1984 model): (a) the tax-
payer's contributions are included in the taxpayer's tax base;
(b) growth in contributions is excluded from the tax base; (c)
upon retirement, benefits are received tax-free.
4. The hybrid model (current model): a hybrid of models 2 and
3 above, in which: (a) the taxpayer's contributions are included
in the taxpayer's tax base; (b) growth in contributions is ex-
cluded from the tax base; (c) upon retirement, one-half of ben-
efits are taxed if half the taxpayer's retirement benefits plus
other income exceed certain levels.
As applied to the unique nature of the social security retire-
t Mr. Brown is an associate with the Borene Law Firm, P.A., in Minneapolis.
He received an L.L.M. degree in Taxation from William Mitchell College of Law in
1989.
1. To simplify the analysis this article will not address other aspects of the social
security system, such as survival benefits, disability benefits, spouses' benefits or chil-
dren's benefits.
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ment system, these four models will be compared as to how
equally they tax individuals of relatively equal income, both
before and after retirement, and how progressive they are in
taxing individuals across income levels, before and after retire-
ment. In general, the results of this comparison are that the
consumption model is the best at treating equals equally,
before and after retirement. It also appears to be the least re-
gressive in taxing individuals before retirement. After retire-
ment, the hybrid model may be the most progressive, but there
is some question about whether its progressivity is desirable.
I. IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
From the individual's point of view, the social security retire-
ment system is basically a method of retirement insurance
under which the Social Security Administration (SSA) first
withholds portions of an individual's earned wages throughout
his or her working life. When the individual retires, the system
then pays out a monthly benefit that is related in some way to
the savings he or she contributed. There are a number of dif-
ferences, however, between ordinary saving for retirement and
social security, of which at least four should be considered
when comparing different tax treatments of social security con-
tributions and benefits.
Mandatory Nature of System
With few exceptions, all those who are employed are subject
to the payment of contributions (payroll taxes), and none who
are covered by the system has the power to opt out. 2 Further-
more, contributions cannot be retrieved from the system ex-
cept in the form of benefits after retirement. Because
contributions are required, and from the taxpayer's point of
view, locked into the system, the taxpayer has no freedom to
make other investment or spending choices.
Progressive Benefit Structure
The social security retirement system is not designed to pay
all individuals in proportion to their contributions, as ordinary
savings and retirement accounts are. Instead, the benefit
2. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3101-02 (West 1989).
[Vol. 15
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structure is progressive, paying a higher ratio of benefits to
contributions for people who had lower earnings records 3
This complicates the analysis of the taxation of contributions
and benefits because the progressivity of the benefit structure
can itself be viewed as an extra tax on beneficiaries who had
relatively high earnings records.
4
Pay-As- You-Go Funding
Unlike private retirement plans, which are funded for retir-
ees in advance, social security is funded on a pay-as-you-go ba-
sis. The payroll taxes of today's employees and employers are
not stashed away for their future; they are paid to today's retir-
ees. 5 The present value of an individual's expected benefit
from social security, then, is not only dependent on factors
normally relevant to retirement savings-life expectancy, ex-
pected earnings rates, and rate of inflation-but is also depen-
dent on the receipt of adequate contributions from future
generations, especially for younger individuals, which is in turn
dependent on the numbers of people in employment in the
future, and the rate of growth in the economy.6 These factors
make the present value of expected benefits extremely difficult
to determine accurately, raising questions about how and
whether such values should be taxed.
The Incidence of the Payroll Tax
For each employee, the payroll tax is a flat-rate tax paid to
the social security trust fund, calculated on the employee's
wages (up to a wage ceiling), and assessed equally on the em-
ployer and the employee. In the current year, 1989, the tax
rate is 6.06% and the wage ceiling per employee is $48,000. 7
An employee with $70,000 in wages in 1989, will have paid the
social security trust fund $2,909 in payroll taxes (6.06% of
$48,000, the maximum wage subject to the tax). That amount
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 415 (West Supp. 1989).
4. B. STEIN, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION 246 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1989).
6. See Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert & Shoven, Social Security: A Financial Appraisal
Across and Within Generations, 40 NAT'L TAxJ. 19 (1987).
7. Actual withholding of wages is at a rate of 7.51% of the employee's wage
base, because the social security tax rate is combined with the hospital insurance tax
rate of 1.45%. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101, 3121 (West 1989); 42 U.S.C.A. § 430 (West
1983).
19891
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will have been matched by the employer. An employee with
$35,000 in wages in 1989 will have paid $2,121 in payroll taxes
(6.06% of $35,000), matched by the employer.
The above examples show that it is incorrect to refer to the
payroll tax on the whole as a flat-rate tax. If it were, then the
tax on the $35,000 wage earner would have been one-half the
tax on the $70,000 wage earner. In fact, it is 72.9% ($2,121 of
$2,909). Although the tax is flat up to the wage ceiling of
$48,000, beyond that it is a regressive tax, decreasing in per-
centage the higher the wage. The effective tax rate on the
$35,000 wage earner is 6.06%, but on the $70,000 wage
earner it is reduced to 4.155%.
The tax is regressive for another reason-it is imposed on
wages only, not on all income. Since non-wage income is free
from any payroll tax, the more of such income a person has the
more the payroll tax falls off as a percentage of his or her total
income. It has been shown that this will tend to occur among
more highly paid individuals, because the higher a person's in-
come, the greater the amount and percentage of income that
comes from sources other than wages. 8
The regressivity of the payroll tax is magnified further by the
"pass-along" practices of employers. Although on paper the
incidence of the tax is shared equally by the employer and the
employee, empirical studies have shown that a substantial part
of the employer's share is passed along to the employee in the
form of reduced wages to compensate for the employer's obli-
gation. 9 For wage rates above $48,000, this drag on em-
ployee's wages would lessen, because the employer's liability
ends at the $48,000 salary level. If, in the examples above, the
employer passed its entire payroll tax burden on to the em-
ployees, the employee who received $35,000 in wages would
have an effective payroll tax of $4,242, or 12.12%, while the
employee paid $70,000 would have an effective payroll tax of
$5,818, or 8.31%. The pass-along increased the lower wage
earner's tax rate by 6.06%, but only increased the higher wage
earner's rate by 4.155%.
8. A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 89-90 (1977). The earned
income credit, introduced in 1975, eases the progressivity for low-income families
with children, but it does not apply to individuals who are not qualified heads of
households or married with children. .26 U.S.C.A. § 32 (West Supp. 1989).
9. A. MUNNELL, supra note 8, at 85-89.
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Taking the above characteristics of the social security retire-
ment system as given, the question is how well each of the four
models of taxation provides horizontal and vertical equity.
II. ACCRETION AND CONSUMPTION COMPARED
Under the accretion model, income equals consumption
plus the change in value of accumulated wealth between ac-
counting periods.' 0 Consumption refers to the "ultimate use
or destruction of economic resources," and accumulated
wealth refers to the retention of those resources. I" An accre-
tion model income tax will seek to include in an individual's
tax base all consumption plus accumulated savings on an an-
nual basis, whether or not those savings are cashed out. The
accretion model therefore will assess an equal tax on two tax-
payers with $50,000 of earnings in a year, even though one
taxpayer consumes the entire $50,000 in the year and the
other taxpayer consumes $25,000 and saves $25,000. In other
words, the pure accretion model ignores the uses to which the
income is put.
The consumption model, on the other hand, seeks to in-
clude only consumption in an individual's tax base. If one tax-
payer earns $50,000 but consumes only $25,000, and another
taxpayer earns $25,000 and consumes all of it, the two will be
taxed equally. The consumption model treats equal consum-
ers equally, regardless of their accumulated wealth. It leaves
the taxation of wealth to the inheritance tax system.' 2
The debate about whether it is better to tax equal consumers
equally or equal income-receivers equally is beyond the scope
of this article, but advantages and disadvantages of doing each
can be seen in their applications to the social security retire-
ment system.
1. Measurement of Income
If social security is perceived as a series of investments fol-
lowed by the receipt of returns on those investments, then pay-
roll taxes are analogous to savings. Under the accretion
10. Andrews, A Consumption-Type of Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1114 (1974) (citing H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938)).
11. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J.
1081, 1084 (1980).
12. Andrews, supra note 10, at 1169.
19891
5
Brown: A Comparison of Four Models of Taxation in Their Treatment of Soc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL I-4 W REVIEW
model, where the uses to which income is put (consumption or
savings) are ignored, the value of social security contributions
("investments") would be subject to income tax. If one were
setting aside money in a savings account for retirement, the
taxable value of that investment would simply be the amount
of money invested. It may not be so simple, however, to place
a value on social security contributions. Money put in a sav-
ings account has value by virtue of the fact that it can be mar-
keted, that is, it can be saved or traded for something of equal
value.1 3 Social security contributions, however, are not freely
marketable, because they are required by law, and because the
return on contributions is put off until retirement and the
value of that return is a matter of speculation.14 The portion
of the taxpayer's income earmarked for social security contri-
butions simply is not worth as much to the taxpayer (or any-
body else) in present value as the rest of the taxpayer's
earnings. In fact, if a retiree were to look back over the span of
his or her working career, the retiree would see that some so-
cial security contributions had no effect at all on the monthly
amount of benefits received, and therefore could arguably be
deemed valueless.15 Contributions only have value to the ex-
tent that they play a role in the calculation of the taxpayer's
retirement benefits. There are so many variables that go into
that calculation (years of earnings, amount of earnings, marital
status, inflation, and solvency of the social security trust fund,
to name a few), that the calculation of the present value of a
particular contribution, from a market point of view, would be
guesswork. Likewise, the calculation of the value of accumula-
tion of the contribution would be a matter of speculation; and
the measurement of income on the receipt on benefits would
be affected, because the measurement of contributions and
benefits would be reflected in the taxpayer's basis in his or her
investment.
For the sake of simplification, an accretion model proponent
may favor using the actual value of the taxpayer's social secur-
13. Warren, supra note i1, at 1086-90.
14. Boskin, supra note 6, at 21, 33.
15. In calculating an individual's eligibility, the SSA need only find forty calendar
quarters of sufficient earnings (with contributions) in order to find an individual eligi-
ble. 42 U.S.C.A. § 414 (West 1983). In calculating benefits, the SSA then ignores
the five years of the individual's lowest wages (and contributions). 42 U.S.C.A. § 415
(West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 15
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ity contribution as the present value, but it is unlikely that any
reliable estimate of annual growth on the investment can be
made.' 6 Of course, if no annual tax on growth is imposed, the
model would no longer be a pure accretion model, and the
taxpayer would have the benefit of deferral of taxation on the
accumulation of income from the contributions. The choice,
then, is between an inaccurate estimate and taxation of annual
growth, perhaps with a later correction based on the actual re-
turn on investment,' 7 or tax deferral.
The consumption model experiences no income measure-
ment problems. Because social security contributions are sav-
ings, they are not included in the income tax base, so the
model is not concerned with measuring them. Similarly, the
model is not concerned with the measurement of benefits
when received and consumed, because when benefits are re-
ceived they are freely marketable. The model is not concerned
with recovery of basis because none of the contributions or ac-
cumulation is taxed. Clearly, the consumption model would
be much easier to put into practice than the accretion model.
2. Equal Treatment of Equals
1. Wage Earners Versus Non- Wage Earners. 8 The payroll tax
does not provide horizontal equity, mainly because it is a tax
on payroll only. Those who have total income equivalent to
wage earners from non-employment sources escape the payroll
tax. Therefore, an individual with non-employment income
will have more money available than an individual with an
equal income consisting of wages.
Suppose there are three people with equal pre-tax (payroll
tax and income tax) income: A, a $30,000 wage earner; B, with
an income of $30,000, half of which is from wages and half
from capital gains and interest on savings; and C, a retiree with
a non-wage income of $30,000. The payroll tax on A (em-
ployee's share) would be $1,818; the payroll tax on B (em-
ployee's share) would be $909; and the payroll tax on C would
16. See Boskin, supra note 6. See also Taylor, American Politics, Public Opinion, and
Social Security Financing, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 235 (F. Skidmore ed. 1981).
17. Warren, supra note 11, at 1100-05.
18. The term non-wage earners is not meant to encompass self-employed indi-
viduals, who do participate in the social security retirement system, but at different
contribution rates from those in covered employment. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West
1988).
19891
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be $0. After assessment of the payroll tax, then, B would have
more available income than A, and C would have more than B.
The accretion model tax would include the present values of
the payroll taxes in the tax bases of A and B (both employee's
and employers shares), along with any growth that had built up
during the year in A's and B's investment in social security, if
such a thing could be measured. If we assume that the present
values of A's and B's total payroll taxes were at least equal to
the actual amounts of A's and B's shares of the taxes, then the
accretion model would at best preserve the inequities caused
by the payroll tax system by including the social security con-
tributions in the tax base even though they were unavailable to
A and B, and at worst would exacerbate the inequities by in-
cluding in A's and B's income any growth that had built up in
their investments in social security. A would be taxed the
most, then B, then C, even though A would have the least
amount of available income to pay the tax, B next, and C the
most.
The consumption tax, on the other hand, would only tax A,
B, and C on their available, consumed income. The payroll
taxes and any accumulation of them would not be included in
the tax base. If we assume that of their $30,000 pre-tax in-
comes, A, B and C all "saved" equivalent amounts (A: $1,818
in payroll taxes, B: $909 in payroll taxes and $909 in savings
account, and C: $1,818 in a savings account), then all three
would be taxed at the same rate. If the only savings of any of
them had come from payroll taxes, and all the rest of the in-
come were consumed, C would have the highest tax base, then
B, then A. The consumption model, then, tends to diminish
the horizontal inequities of the payroll tax.
2. From a Lifetime Perspective. When considered from a life-
time perspective, the accretion model seems to correct some of
the horizontal inequity between people of approximately the
same age.
Assume that A's and B's patterns of income remain the same
throughout their working lives, so that, on the threshold of re-
tirement they have had equal total incomes, but A has contrib-
uted twice as much in payroll taxes as B has. Because social
security benefit rates are progressive in the sense that those
with lower covered earnings will have a higher rate of return,
[Vol. 15
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the system again puts A at a disadvantage relative to B.19 The
difference between what A would have gotten if the benefit
structure were directly proportional to contributions, and what
he actually receives, can be seen an extra tax on A. 20
Here the accretion model tax will help A relative to B. A's
lower rate of return will mean that a greater proportion of his
social security retirement benefit will be a recovery of basis
than will be true for B, so more of A's benefit will be excluded
from the tax base when received.
Assuming that B's rate of return is twice as good as A's, this
is illustrated using simple figures as follows:
A B
Social security contributions $200 $100
Gross return $250 $150
Profit $ 50 $ 50
30% tax $ 15 $ 15
After-tax return $235 $135
Ratio of A's contributions to B's: 200/100 = 2
Ratio of A's gross return to B's: 250/150 = 1.67
Ratio of A's after-tax return to B's: 235/135 = 1.74
As illustrated, the accretion model tax reduces B's advanta-
geous rate of return relative to A. In this particular case, since
A and B are assumed to have equal total incomes, the accretion
model tax moves toward an equitable result.
2 '
Because the consumption model will tax benefits fully (as-
suming they are fully consumed), allowing no recovery of ba-
sis, it appears to leave intact the extra tax on A relative to B:
19. After calculating an amount known as the average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME) for an individual, the SSA calculates the individual's primary insurance
amount, or basic monthly benefit, by adding 90% of the first $310 of AIME, 32% of
the AIME above $310 to $1866, and 15% of any AIME above $1866. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 415 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
20. B. STEIN, supra note 4, at 144-48, 246. Professor Stein also compares low
and high wage earners with equal total incomes in his analysis.
21. This is consistent with Professor Warren's contention that the accretion tax is
concerned with the outcomes of investment. Warren, supra note 11, at 1100-05.
19891
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A B
Social security contributions $200 $100
Gross return $250 $150
30% tax on fully consumed return $ 75 $ 45
Net consumption $175 $105
Ratio of A's contributions to B's: 200/100 = 2
Ratio of A's gross return to B's: 250/150 = 1.67
Ratio of A's net consumption B's: 175/105 = 1.67
The fact that A gets a worse deal than B on his investment
appears not to be taken into consideration by the consumption
model. The flaw in this analysis, however, is that it is not tak-
ing a lifetime perspective. Under the consumption model, B
could not have reached retirement with the same total income
as A but only half the social security contributions, without
either having consumed (and been taxed on) the difference be-
tween their contributions or having saved the difference and
carried it with him, along with a potential tax when the savings
are consumed. The model in Table A of a social security sys-
tem shows how, from a lifetime perspective, the consumption
tax balances its higher taxation of A during retirement with
higher taxation of B before retirement. (The model assumes
that A and B consumed all their income except their social se-
curity contributions.)
It can be seen from the table that the consumption model
has in a sense already taken basis into consideration by exclud-
ing contributions from income. During A's and B's pre-retire-
ment years, A was taxed only $33,818.40 while B was taxed
$34,909.20, because A's excludable social security contribu-
tions were greater than B's. The contributions are allowed to
grow tax-free under the consumption model, yielding after re-
tirement more income per dollar invested than the accretion
model tax would yield. The lifetime effect of the consumption
model tax, then, is to tax A less relative to B in pre-retirement
years, reflecting the fact that A has less income available for
consumption than B at that time, to allow contributions to
grow tax-free, and to tax A more relative to B during retire-
ment, reflecting the fact that A will have more available than B
for consumption at that time.
This pattern of taxation is superior to the accretion model's
for two reasons. First, it more accurately reflects the tax-
payer's ability to pay taxes by taxing only available income.
1000 [Vol. 15
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TABLE A: CONSUMPTION MODEL TAX ON Two TAXPAYERS WITH
EQUIVALENT TOTAL INCOME BUT DIFFERENT EARNINGS
A B
Taxable S.S. Taxable
Gross (Consumed) Contrib. Tax at Gross (Consumed) S.S. Tax at
Income Income (6.06%) 30% Income Income Contrib. 30%
Year 1 $ 30,000 $ 28,182 $1,818 $ 8,454.60 $ 30,000 $ 29,091 $ 909 $ 8,727.30
Year 2 30,000 28,182 1,818 8,454.60 30,000 29,091 909 8,727.30
Year 3 30,000 28,182 1,818 8,454.60 30,000 29,091 909 8,727.30
Year 4 30,000 28,182 1,818 8,454.60 30,000 29,091 909 8,727.30
$120,000 $112,728 $7,272 $33,818.40 $120,000 $116,364 $3,636 $34,909.20
Retirement:
S.S. Taxed Taxed S.S. Taxed Taxed
Return at 20% at 30% Return at 20% at 30%
Year 5 $2,272.50 $454.50 $681.75 $1,363.50 $272.70 $409.05
Year 6 2,272.50 454.50 681.75 1,363.50 272.70 409.05
Year 7 2,272.50 454.50 681.75 1,363.50 272.70 409.05
Year 8 2,272.50 454.50 681.75 1,363.50 272.70 409.05
$9,090.00 $1,818.00 $2,727.00 $5,454.00 $1,090.80 $1,636.20
(25% apprec. on S.S. (50% apprec. on S.S.
contribution) contribution)
Assuming 301, income tax pie- and post-retirement
Ratio of A's lifetime taxes to B's: $36,545.40 / 36,545.40 = I
Ratio of A's net consumption to B's: $85,272.60 / 85,272.60 - I
.,ssuinng a 307 increase tax pre-retenient
anid a 207 increase tax post-refirenieit
Ratio of A's lifetime taxes to B's: $35,636.40 / 36,000 = .989
Ratio of A's net consumption to B's: $86,181.60 / 85,818 - 1.004
Second, because of the tax deferral characteristics of the con-
sumption model, it provides more money to retirees than the
accretion model, achieving the main goal of the social security
system more efficiently than the accretion model.
22
The consumption model does not, however, cancel the ad-
vantage given to B by the social security benefit structure. If
benefits were proportional instead of progressive-for in-
stance, if A's return were $10,908 instead of $9,090 (propor-
tional to B's return of $5,454 on $3,636 of contributions)-A
would have $86,545.20 in net consumption compared to B's
22. As the table shows, in addition to tax deferral there is a benefit if the greater
consumption occurs in years of lower earnings (20% tax rate as opposed to 30%
rate).
1989] 1001
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$85,272.60.23 Instead, because of the progressive benefit
structure, A's and B's net consumption is equal.2 4 This not
only causes inequities between people of equal incomes and
different contribution levels, it also causes inequities between
people of different incomes, as will be seen in the next section.
3. Fair Treatment Across Income Levels
1. Before Retirement. As has been seen above, the payroll tax
is regressive because it falls on employment income only, and
is imposed only on the first $48,000 of an individual's wages.
It has a greater impact on people at the lower end of the in-
come scale because a greater portion of the income of low- and
middle-income people consists of employment income subject
to the payroll tax. As wage rates rise above $48,000, the pay-
roll tax takes less and less of a percentage of an individual's
wages.
One could design either the consumption model or the ac-
cretion model tax so as to minimize the regressive effect of the
payroll tax simply by increasing the slope of the progressive
income tax to compensate for the payroll tax. Since payroll
taxes are part of the tax base in an accretion model income tax,
adjustments to the progressivity of the income tax will have a
greater impact in the accretion model than in the consumption
model, where payroll taxes are excluded from the income tax
base. The higher the income level, however, the more the ad-
justments should have the same effect, as the payroll tax be-
comes less and less of a factor.
2. After Retirement. It is not clear that the progressive rates
of benefits in the social security retirement system, when con-
sidered as extra taxes on people who had higher earnings
levels when they were working, will yield a progressive tax rate
when based on the current income levels of retirees. The as-
sumption of the SSA is that people who had high earnings
records will probably have more money after retirement than
those who had low earnings records, so they will not need as
23. A's retirement benefits would increase by $1,818.00 and be taxed at 30%, for
an additional net consumption of $1,272.60.
24. A factor not directly related, but which tends to reduce the effect of the pro-
gressive benefit structure is the probability that A and B will be taxed at lower rates
overall when they retire because they will have less income than they did while
working.
[Vol. 15
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high a return on their investment. 25 One can think of many
situations, however, where a retiree's earnings record does not
reflect her income during retirement. Consider C, who had a
relatively low earnings record and expects to receive a 6% re-
turn on her investment in social security, but who also just re-
ceived a large inheritance and expects interest income of
$25,000 per year. Also consider D, who had a relatively high
earnings record and expects to receive only a 3% return on
her investment in social security, and in addition has only
$6,000 per year in other income. The tax inherent in the dif-
ferent rates of return falls more heavily on D, who has less cur-
rent income. Perhaps the more common case is one in which
the person with a higher earnings record also has higher in-
come during retirement, but there certainly seem to be risks of
inequities in basing progressive rates on earnings records,
rather than current income.
Given an accretion model and a consumption model tax with
equally progressive rates, the consumption model will tax ac-
cording to each person's total consumed income, regardless of
the inherent tax in the social security benefit structure. To the
extent that the benefit structure is progressive when based on
current income, it will leave it progressive. The accretion
model, on the other hand, will provide basis recovery for social
security benefits, which will tend to be a greater benefit to the
high wage earner with a low rate of return, than to a low wage
earner with a high rate of return. The effect will probably be
to lower the progressivity of the combined income-benefit tax,
but it will also be to ameliorate the inequitable results in cases
like the one involving C and D above. For both accretion and
consumption models, however, vertical equity would be much
easier to guarantee if the benefit structure were proportional
rather than progressive, and the tax rates were based entirely
on current income, not on a combination of current income
and prior earnings rates.
III. THE PARTIALLY TAX-PREPAID MODEL
The partially tax-prepaid model was what the law provided
prior to the Social Security Amendments of 1983.26 It was an
odd combination of accretion and consumption concepts. The
25. R. BALL, SOCIAL SECURITY TODAY AND TOMORROW 6-8 (1978).
26. 26 U.S.C.A. § 86 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
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taxpayer paid income tax on his or her contribution, which was
consistent with the accretion model, but contrary to that model
did not pay tax on the employer's contribution, even though it
was for the taxpayer's benefit and added to the total invest-
ment on the taxpayer's behalf.
The failure of the model to tax employees on employer con-
tributions would make sense given the prevailing assumption
that these contributions were passed along to employees in the
form of lower wages. The employer contributions would then
be analogous to salary-reduction contributions by an employer
to an employee retirement plan. Growth on all the contribu-
tions was totally deferred, as it would be under a consumption
model tax, but benefits were completely tax-free, which was
like neither the consumption nor the accretion tax. In effect,
the benefits derived from the employer's contributions com-
pletely escaped taxation.
At least as to the employee's contributions, however, the sys-
tem was like an inverted consumption tax, in which the tax was
paid up front on the investment, and all income derived from it
was tax-free (under the consumption tax the investment is free
of tax and the ultimate consumption is taxed). As William An-
drews points out, these two methods of taxation are equivalent
so long as the tax rates are the same at the times the tax es
occur, and adjustments for inflation are made.
27
Of course, it is unlikely the tax rates would be the same from
generation to generation. One generalization that can be
made is that rates over a worker's lifetime are likely to be
higher under the tax-prepaid model because the taxes are im-
posed during the taxpayer's working years, when income is
likely to be higher.
Under the tax-prepaid model, because the payroll tax is in-
cluded in an individual's taxable income, the person who relies
primarily on wages for her income fares worse than the person
with equal income who does not rely primarily on wages. The
horizontal inequities of the payroll tax are passed along
through the income tax. In the example of A, B, and C, dis-
cussed above, A, the wage earner, would pay income tax on
$30,000, even though he has only $28,182 available to pay the
tax, because of the assessment of the payroll tax. B would pay
27. Andrews, supra note 10, at 1123-28.
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income tax on $30,000, but have $29,091 of available income.
C, the retiree, would have a full $30,000 available to pay in-
come tax, and would have a reduced income tax relative to A
and B if we assume that a portion of his income consists of
social security retirement benefits, because these benefits are
not taxed under the tax-prepaid model. So if C's social secur-
ity retirement pay were $6,000, then C would only be taxed on
$24,000, even though he had $30,000 of available income.
The combination of the wage earner having to pay tax up-front
and the retiree paying no tax on social security benefits widens
the gap in current taxation between the wage earner and the
retired non-wage earner with equivalent incomes.
This inequality may be seen as a good thing, in that it fur-
thers the good of providing savings to retirees, As efficient as
the tax-prepaid model is, however, at providing income to re-
tirees, it is not as efficient as the consumption model, and as-
sesses a greater cost in terms of fairness.
First, the retiree's benefits under the tax-prepaid model are
not really tax-free because the retiree would have paid taxes on
his contributions (and arguably on part of his employer's as
well) throughout his working career. This tax would be
equivalent to the consumption model's tax on benefits, but
since it is imposed during people's higher earning years it will
impose a greater burden than the consumption tax. Under the
consumption model, excluding the effects of inflation, social
security contributions will always yield a larger after-tax benefit
than they would under the tax-prepaid model, so long as the
individual's tax rate during retirement will be lower than it was
during his working years.
The second problem with the tax-prepaid model is that it
ignores what happens to an investment after the point at which
the tax is imposed. In Alvin Warren's analysis, the tax-prepaid
model necessarily takes an ex ante view, and as a result does not
treat people fairly with respect to the outcomes of their invest-
ments.28 The consumption model, on the other hand, imposes
its tax at the end of the investment, when savings are finally
used. It therefore bases its tax on the outcome of the invest-
ment, after all contingencies, from windfalls to unexpected
losses, have occurred. If, for example, a saver under the tax-
prepaid model has $100 and invests $70 and pays a tax of $30,
28. Warren, supra note 11, at 1100-05.
1989] 1005
15
Brown: A Comparison of Four Models of Taxation in Their Treatment of Soc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
he will have paid $30 no matter what the investment yields,
even if it yields nothing. A saver under the consumption
model would have $100 to invest tax-free, and if he loses $70
and consumes $30, he would only be responsible for a tax on
$30 (say, $9 at a 30% rate).29
In the context of the social security system, then, "investors"
in social security under the tax-prepaid model will have locked
in their taxes on their investments long before knowing what
their rate of return will be. The system cannot react to fluctua-
tions in rates of return. This is especially unfair in view of the
fact that investors in social security don't really have a choice
whether to make the investment in the first place.
The tax-prepaid model offers nothing beneficial in terms of
vertical equity. For people under retirement age it carries with
it the regressive payroll tax.
IV. THE HYBRID MODEL
Beginning in 1984, social security retirement benefits were
for the first time made subject to income tax. The two basic
characteristics of the new tax are that: (1) it is imposed on no
more than one-half of the benefits received, and (2) it is im-
posed only if one-half of the benefits received plus other in-
come exceed certain levels ($32,000 for married couples filing
jointly, $25,000 for individuals).30 The other characteristics of
the tax system are the same as in the tax-prepaid model-em-
ployee contributions are included in the income tax base,
growth is excluded, and, up to the point where the tax starts,
benefits are received tax-free.
The idea behind exposing only one-half of the benefits to
taxation was based on the observation that during the individ-
ual's working life, one-half of his contributions were taxed
when paid (employee contributions), while the other half were
yet to be taxed (employer contributions).
The idea for the current system sprang from the 1979 Advi-
sory Council on Social Security. Some on the Council sug-
gested that taxing one-half of the contributions and one-half of
the benefits was not the equivalent of taxing one or the other
29. Professor Warren also contends that the consumption model necessarily
takes an ex ante view, but his explanation on this point is not convincing. Id.
30. 26 U.S.C.A. § 86 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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fully.3 ' It was pointed out that in the aggregate, contributions
of employees then entering covered employment were ex-
pected to total no more than 17% of the benefits the system
was expected to pay them, and that therefore 83% of benefits
should be taxed. The majority of the Council, however, rea-
soned that since the employees paid half the cost of the contri-
butions they should receive half the benefits tax-free. 32 This is
entirely consistent with the tax-prepaid model, and in fact
completes the gap left by the partially tax-prepaid model dis-
cussed above.
But because the new system collects taxes up-front on em-
ployee contributions, probably at higher rates than would ap-
ply if it collected tax just on benefits, it probably is not as
efficient as the consumption model would be at building up
savings. It also has the rigidity problem that the tax pre-paid
model has. In fact, except for the approximately 8% of retir-
ees whose incomes are high enough to pay the new tax, the
system is exactly the same as the tax-prepaid model.33
The new law increases the progressivity of the combined in-
come-benefit structure tax for those retirees whose incomes
are above the tax threshold levels. Vertical inequities can still
exist above these income levels because the benefit structure
will continue to reward people with lower earnings records, re-
gardless of these individuals' total incomes, and because only
half of the benefits are subject to tax. 34 Nevertheless, the tax
will have a progressive influence because it will assess larger
amounts of taxes against people with larger current incomes.
Horizontal inequities can continue to occur both above and
below the tax thresholds under the current system, because of
the contribution and benefit structure. In addition, a new kind
of horizontal inequity can occur due to the new tax law, be-
tween people who are just under and people who are just over
the threshold income levels. Professors Pollard and Speer
have identified a relatively narrow range of income (equal to a
31. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE
1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 74-76 (Comm. Print 1979).
32. Id.
33. See Chernick & Reschovsky, The Taxation of Social Security, 38 NAT'L TAXJ. 141
(1985). This percentage has probably risen since 1985, and will continue to rise,
because the income threshold levels are not indexed to inflation.
34. Hoyt, Income Taxation of Social Security Benefits: Balancing Social Policy with Tax
Policy, 54 UMKC L. REV. 399, 430-33 (1986).
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person's annual social security benefit, from $5,000 to $10,000
for most people), for which tax planning is crucial to tax sav-
ings. 35 Tax planning, of course, is liable to mean more ac-
countants' and lawyers' fees, and more administrative costs. It
is difficult to say whether the result of increased progressivity
was worth the cost of the legislation, but it does seem that the
new system solves few of the inequities of the old system, adds
at least one, and has the look more of expedience than reform.
CONCLUSION
Social security has two very laudable, but sometimes con-
flicting, goals: To provide a fair return to workers when they
reach retirement, based on their earnings-related contribu-
tions to the system, and to insure a certain minimum standard
of living for all.3 6 The system has maintained the link between
earnings and benefits, and at the same time the benefit struc-
ture has provided a minimum standard of living to retired low-
wage workers, but at some cost to ideas of fairness among indi-
viduals with different sources of income, at different income
levels, and in different age groups. This brief investigation
into some of these inequities has not found a model of taxation
that will correct the inequities without the assistance of a
change in the contribution and benefit structure itself. The
biggest stumbling block to equity is the benefit structure. If
the benefit structure were proportional rather than progres-
sive, some of the inequities would vanish regardless of the in-
come tax structure. The consumption model tax, however,
appears to rise above the others, even with the burden of the
progressive benefit structure, in its ease of income measure-
ment, relative lack of regressivity for people before retirement,
ability to accumulate savings faster, flexibility to adapt to
changing returns on investments, and ability to avoid creating
any horizontal or vertical inequities on its own. There are per-
suasive arguments in literature for replacing the progressive
benefit structure with a decoupled system, with one part pro-
viding proportional benefits to retirees based on their contri-
butions, and one part providing an expanded program of
income support to low-income people, funded from general
35. Pollard & Speer, The New Tax on Social Security Benefits: Will There Be Some Un-
pleasant Surprises?, 62 TAXES 716 (1984).
36. A. MUNNELL, supra note 8, at 5-8.
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revenues. 37 If that day ever comes, it would be good if the con-
sumption model tax were in place.
37. Id. at 40-42.
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